Resource-scan receipts

sansan0/TrendRadar

Canonical URL: https://github.com/sansan0/TrendRadar · Fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sansan0/TrendRadar/HEAD/README.md · Machine form: /v1/resource-scans/github-com-sansan0-trendradar-ae19178305 · Markdown

Latest receipt: 5 of 8 checks flagged — the findings below are the record. SHA-256 of the exact bytes scanned: a3b3e867efadb4c6a4da5a25e06b33c1fabfaba4d8907fe47d0ba768d31fba08 · 158651 bytes · scanned 2026-10-27T12:22:38.415Z · scanner resource-scan-v1 · ledger entry 1586.

Analysis is static only: the bytes were read as text and were never executed, installed or run. Nothing was fetched from behind a login.

Checks (latest receipt)

• Outbound network references — flag

  The scanned bytes reference outbound network activity to these domains: api.day.app, api.slack.com, api.telegram.org, apps.apple.com, astral.sh, bark.day.app, core.telegram.org, dash.cloudflare.com, developer.work.weixin.qq.com, docs.ntfy.sh, f-droid.org, github.com, hooks.slack.com, hub.docker.com, img.shields.io, linux.do, mp.weixin.qq.com, newsnow.busiyi.world, ntfy.sh, ntfy.yourdomain.com, ocr.sandev.cc, open.feishu.cn, pages.cloudflare.com, play.google.com, sansan0.github.io, slack.com, star-history.dera.page, telegram.org, trendradar.sandev.cc, trendshift.io, weixin.qq.com, work.weixin.qq.com, www.apismart.ai, www.feishu.cn, www.rapidproxy.io, www.swiftproxy.net. Any resource that reaches the network can send data out as well as bring data in; the findings name what the bytes reference, and the reader decides whether that fits the resource's stated purpose.

  Evidence: domain: api.day.app; domain: api.slack.com; domain: api.telegram.org; domain: apps.apple.com; domain: astral.sh; domain: bark.day.app; domain: core.telegram.org; domain: dash.cloudflare.com; domain: developer.work.weixin.qq.com; domain: docs.ntfy.sh; domain: f-droid.org; domain: github.com; domain: hooks.slack.com; domain: hub.docker.com; domain: img.shields.io; domain: linux.do; domain: mp.weixin.qq.com; domain: newsnow.busiyi.world; domain: ntfy.sh; domain: ntfy.yourdomain.com; domain: ocr.sandev.cc; domain: open.feishu.cn; domain: pages.cloudflare.com; domain: play.google.com; domain: sansan0.github.io; domain: slack.com; domain: star-history.dera.page; domain: telegram.org; domain: trendradar.sandev.cc; domain: trendshift.io; domain: weixin.qq.com; domain: work.weixin.qq.com; domain: www.apismart.ai; domain: www.feishu.cn; domain: www.rapidproxy.io; domain: www.swiftproxy.net

• Credential and environment access — flag

  The scanned bytes contain credential or environment access patterns: secret-named variables (API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD and similar names); credential file paths (.env, .ssh, credential stores). The receipt names the pattern kinds only; no credential value is reproduced here.

  Evidence: secret-named variables (API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD and similar names); credential file paths (.env, .ssh, credential stores)

• Install and postinstall hooks — pass

  No install or postinstall hooks were found in the scanned bytes.

• Obfuscation and encoded payloads — pass

  No obfuscation or encoded-payload signs were found in the scanned bytes.

• Shell-outs and download-and-execute — flag

  The scanned bytes contain shell-out or download patterns: shell command tools named in the bytes (curl, wget, powershell); download-and-execute pattern (fetched content passed to an executor in the same file). Code that runs shell commands acts with the full permissions of whoever runs it.

  Evidence: shell command tools named in the bytes (curl, wget, powershell); download-and-execute pattern (fetched content passed to an executor in the same file)

• Permission declarations vs behavior — flag

  The bytes show network, credentials behavior, and no permissions declaration was found in the scanned bytes to compare it against.

  Evidence: behavior: network; behavior: credentials

• Known-bad indicators — flag

  The scanned bytes match these known-bad indicators from the scanner's published pattern list: pipe-to-shell: a download piped straight into a shell interpreter. Each match is a reproducible pattern match on the bytes named by the hash; re-running the published check on the same bytes reaches the same finding.

  Evidence: pipe-to-shell: a download piped straight into a shell interpreter

• Provenance facts (weak signals) — pass

  Provenance facts, labeled weak signals — they say where the bytes sit, not what the bytes do: source host: github.com; repository: sansan0/TrendRadar; bytes scanned: 158651; fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sansan0/TrendRadar/HEAD/README.md.

  Evidence: source host: github.com; repository: sansan0/TrendRadar; bytes scanned: 158651; fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sansan0/TrendRadar/HEAD/README.md

History

Every receipt for this artifact so far names the same SHA-256: the bytes have not changed between scans.

• 2026-10-27 — 5 of 8 checks flagged · SHA-256 a3b3e867efadb4c6… · 158651 bytes · scanner resource-scan-v1 · ledger entry 1586