Resource-scan receipts

NVIDIA/SkillSpector

Canonical URL: https://github.com/NVIDIA/SkillSpector · Fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NVIDIA/SkillSpector/HEAD/README.md · Machine form: /v1/resource-scans/github-com-nvidia-skillspector-98255810d4 · Markdown

Latest receipt: 6 of 8 checks flagged — the findings below are the record. SHA-256 of the exact bytes scanned: 1bfa919d59a94daf50c668d8ccaee83a05124c899613c6f3e06ec0437470e2d2 · 58475 bytes · scanned 2026-10-27T12:26:15.020Z · scanner resource-scan-v1 · ledger entry 1663.

Analysis is static only: the bytes were read as text and were never executed, installed or run. Nothing was fetched from behind a login.

Checks (latest receipt)

• Outbound network references — flag

  The scanned bytes reference outbound network activity to these domains: api-docs.deepseek.com, api.anthropic.com, api.groq.com, api.skill.io, docs.nvidia.com, example.openai.azure.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, img.shields.io, modelcontextprotocol.io, my-gateway.example.com, osv.dev, platform.claude.com, www.apache.org, www.python.org. Any resource that reaches the network can send data out as well as bring data in; the findings name what the bytes reference, and the reader decides whether that fits the resource's stated purpose.

  Evidence: domain: api-docs.deepseek.com; domain: api.anthropic.com; domain: api.groq.com; domain: api.skill.io; domain: docs.nvidia.com; domain: example.openai.azure.com; domain: generativelanguage.googleapis.com; domain: github.com; domain: img.shields.io; domain: modelcontextprotocol.io; domain: my-gateway.example.com; domain: osv.dev; domain: platform.claude.com; domain: www.apache.org; domain: www.python.org; HTTP client or socket calls

• Credential and environment access — flag

  The scanned bytes contain credential or environment access patterns: environment variable reads (process.env / os.environ / getenv); secret-named variables (API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD and similar names); credential file paths (.env, .ssh, credential stores); authorization headers and bearer values. The receipt names the pattern kinds only; no credential value is reproduced here.

  Evidence: environment variable reads (process.env / os.environ / getenv); secret-named variables (API_KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD and similar names); credential file paths (.env, .ssh, credential stores); authorization headers and bearer values

• Install and postinstall hooks — pass

  No install or postinstall hooks were found in the scanned bytes.

• Obfuscation and encoded payloads — flag

  The scanned bytes carry obfuscation or encoding signs: eval or Function-constructor evaluation of text as code. Encoded content cannot be read from the bytes alone, so what it does cannot be checked from the bytes alone either.

  Evidence: eval or Function-constructor evaluation of text as code

• Shell-outs and download-and-execute — flag

  The scanned bytes contain shell-out or download patterns: child process execution (child_process, exec, spawn); shell invocation from Python (subprocess, os.system, Popen); shell command tools named in the bytes (curl, wget, powershell); download-and-execute pattern (fetched content passed to an executor in the same file). Code that runs shell commands acts with the full permissions of whoever runs it.

  Evidence: child process execution (child_process, exec, spawn); shell invocation from Python (subprocess, os.system, Popen); shell command tools named in the bytes (curl, wget, powershell); download-and-execute pattern (fetched content passed to an executor in the same file)

• Permission declarations vs behavior — flag

  The bytes show network, credentials behavior, and no permissions declaration was found in the scanned bytes to compare it against.

  Evidence: behavior: network; behavior: credentials

• Known-bad indicators — flag

  The scanned bytes match these known-bad indicators from the scanner's published pattern list: pipe-to-shell: a download piped straight into a shell interpreter; token- or credential-taking vocabulary (stealer, grabber, exfiltrate). Each match is a reproducible pattern match on the bytes named by the hash; re-running the published check on the same bytes reaches the same finding.

  Evidence: pipe-to-shell: a download piped straight into a shell interpreter; token- or credential-taking vocabulary (stealer, grabber, exfiltrate)

• Provenance facts (weak signals) — pass

  Provenance facts, labeled weak signals — they say where the bytes sit, not what the bytes do: source host: github.com; repository: NVIDIA/SkillSpector; bytes scanned: 58475; fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NVIDIA/SkillSpector/HEAD/README.md.

  Evidence: source host: github.com; repository: NVIDIA/SkillSpector; bytes scanned: 58475; fetched from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NVIDIA/SkillSpector/HEAD/README.md

History

Every receipt for this artifact so far names the same SHA-256: the bytes have not changed between scans.

• 2026-10-27 — 6 of 8 checks flagged · SHA-256 1bfa919d59a94daf… · 58475 bytes · scanner resource-scan-v1 · ledger entry 1663